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Message from the Editors
In 2008, the Naval War College established the Center on Irregular
Warfare & Armed Groups (CIWAG). CIWAG’s primary mission is
twofold: first, to bring cutting-edge research on Irregular Warfare into
the Joint Professional Military Educational (JPME) curricula; and
second, to bring operators, practitioners, and scholars together to share
their knowledge and experiences about a vast array of violent and nonviolent irregular challenges.
This CIWAG case study in one in a series examining the role
of resource and water conflict in national/international security. A
survey of news stories from across the globe show that from 2010–
2013 alone there were incidents of violence—large and small—
involving access to water in Yemen, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Indian,
Kashmir, Brazil, Egypt, Nigeria, Uzbekistan, South Sudan, Mali,
Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Tanzania, Syria, Libya, and Indonesia.
The issue of access to and control of water becomes even more
acute in states in which there is an ongoing conflict or in states that are
trying to transition from conflict to stability. Although we most often
think of water conflicts in terms of access to drinking water, the reality
is that most water is needed for industrial and agricultural purposes;
when rivers run dry, crops fail and communities face famine and
starvation even in some of the world’s dampest places. Moreover, in
some of these countries internal conflicts exacerbate the issue of who
has access to water, and in others, state-to-state friction over dams and
irrigation water has spilt over into armed clashes.
In “Water Wars: The Brahmaputra River and Sino-Indian
Relations,” Mr. Christopher focuses on one specific case of crossborder tensions over water in order to develop a framework for
examining security challenges related to water. Given the short length
of the paper, the discussion focuses on just four of the many issues to
be considered: international river governance norms, food security
issues, water governance, and the key role of geography. Christopher
has also set out some of the basic terminology and strategic issues that
4
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make water shortages a national and international security challenge.
The case study is intended to be a place to begin the
conversation about the linkage between water and security, particularly
in regions in the world where armed groups and irregular warfare are a
daily reality. It should be noted, moreover, there is much more work to
be done in exploring this issue. As a starting point, the bibliography
gives a snapshot of the range of literature on water issues and specific
conflicts in detail.
It is important to note two critical caveats to this case study.
First, the opinions found in this case study are solely those of the author
and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Naval
War College, or CIWAG. Second, while every effort has been made to
correct any factual errors in this work, the author is ultimately
responsible for the content of this case study.
We hope you find this case study useful, and look forward to
hearing your feedback and suggestions for how you can contribute to
the Center on Irregular Warfare & Armed Group’s mission here at the
Naval War College.
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The Brahmaputra River Basin1

1

“Geography of India,” IndiaNetZone, 10 April, 2010,
http://www.indianetzone.com/29/brahmaputra_river_basin.htm
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Asian River Linkages2

2

“Little Linkages Between Rivers of Asia in This Project,” Confluence of
Rivers: Theatre Exchange 2013, 17 March, 2013,
http://5river.wordpress.com/2013/03/17/little-linkages-between-rivers-ofasians-in-this-project/
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I. Introduction
On February 27, 2012, the mighty Brahmaputra River, one of
the largest in the world, ran dry. In the East Siang District of Arunachal
Pradesh, a territory administered by India but claimed by China, people
in the town of Pasighat reported that the usually strong river suddenly
dwindled to almost nothing. The state’s Minister of Water Resources
demanded an investigation into whether the shortage had been caused
by dam building upstream on the Chinese-controlled portion of the
river. “The panic of the people can't be brushed off,” he warned.3
Water has the potential to be one of the great challenges of the
twenty-first century. According to United Nations estimates, more than
half the global population will live in water-stressed or water-scarce
countries by 2025.4 The vast majority of these people will be in China
and India. Changes resulting from continued economic growth and
modernization in these countries—including an increase in irrigated
farming, rising industrial production, expanding consumption in a
growing middle class, and, particularly in China, raising animals for a
more meat-centric diet—will place ever-greater pressure on water
supplies. Macro challenges such as climate change and pollution will
further strain freshwater resources.
As China and India struggle to grow, provide for their citizens,
and expand their respective roles as major players on the world stage,
the two countries are increasingly facing water constraints. This
challenge is made more complex by its shared nature: much of India’s
river water originates in China. Of the rivers that cross the Sino-Indian
border, the most important is the Brahmaputra.
The Brahmaputra River flows for more than two thousand
miles through China, India, and Bangladesh on its journey from the
Himalayas to the Bay of Bengal. It is a source of life and livelihood for
millions along its route. And its future is in question. China has
3

“Brahmaputra Dries Up in Arunachal Pradesh town! Is China Responsible?,”
Economic Times, March 1, 2012.
4
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Fact Sheet,
International Decade for Action, “Water for Life,” 2005-2015,
http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/scarcity.shtml.
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embarked upon a series of dam-building and water-diversion projects
that have the potential to significantly alter the river’s course and flow,
raising the specter of severe harm to those downstream. Although
China has thus far promised to keep its dam projects small and
inconsequential, the river’s massive hydropower potential—particularly
at the Brahmaputra’s Great Canyon, where the river drops thousands of
feet through a mountainous stretch—may well prove too tempting for
China’s planners to resist. Should they choose to press ahead with the
construction of a large dam, India may face a stark choice: risk
provoking Beijing’s anger, and possibly even provoke a military
response, by opposing or trying to block construction, or allow dam
building to proceed and give China the ability to choke off the flow of
one of the India’s most important resources.
This case study examines some of the international, regional,
and local challenges that arise from friction over water resources, using
as a case study the Brahmaputra River. Section II provides background
information, including basic water usage data for China, India, and
Bangladesh; an overview of the Brahmaputra River’s course and
geography; and a history of China’s dam building and water diversion
projects on the river to date. Section III explores four dynamics crucial
to understanding the challenges of the Brahmaputra: international river
governance norms, food security issues, water governance as an issue
involving both international and domestic politics, and the key role that
Tibet plays in Asia’s water challenges. Finally, the concluding section
examines the extent to which a dispute over the river’s use represents a
threat to India and explores India’s options as a downstream state.
It is not clear what caused the sudden but temporary cessation
of the Brahmaputra’s flow in March of 2012. What is clear, however, is
that demand for the river’s water exceeds supply, and that the potential
for conflict between the world’s two most populous countries over this
finite resource is real.

12
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II. Background
A. Water Demand in India, China, and Bangladesh
China is home to almost 20% of the world population, but only
about 7% of water resources. The country faces water scarcity, and its
water needs are further stressed by pollution. At present, China’s
Ministry of Environmental Protection has deemed a quarter of China’s
river water so dirty as to be unsuitable for drinking, agriculture, or even
industrial use. Moreover, although China is almost entirely water
independent—that is, almost all of the country’s renewable freshwater
supply comes from rivers that originate within the country—the
distribution of surface water is geographically uneven. The bulk of the
country’s freshwater resources are located in the country’s south and
southwest, which benefits that region’s farms and factories but leaves
the wheat-producing heartland and industrial north dry. To address this
imbalance, Beijing has undertaken an extraordinarily ambitious
hydrological engineering plan called South to North Water Diversion.
By 2050, China hopes to move 45 billion cubic meters of water per
year through a series of tunnels, aqueducts, and canals. Engineers also
seek to link the country’s four major waterways: the Huang He,
Yangtze, Huai He, and Hai He. The water diversion plan includes three
routes—eastern, central, and western—with a total estimated price tag
of around US$62 billion. Water division plans on the Chinese portion
of the Brahmaputra are crucial to the western route.
India is home to about 17% of the world’s population but less
than 4% of water resources, and the country is dependent on foreignoriginating rivers for about a third of its surface water. Water shortages
will exact rising economic and social costs in the country as India’s
population and water needs continue to grow. India’s freshwater supply
is also significantly influenced by weather patterns, with the short
monsoon season responsible for the lion’s share of the country’s annual
precipitation. Approximately half of nationwide precipitation falls over

13
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just 15 days, and 90 percent of river flows are concentrated in the
wettest four months of the year.5
Bangladesh is home to 2.15% of the world’s population, and
merely .24% of water resources. The country is almost entirely
dependent on cross-boundary water flows for its supply. For this reason,
any upstream diversion of the Brahmaputra would likely be felt most
keenly by Bangladesh. The Brahmaputra is among Bangladesh’s most
important rivers, and diversion could mean environmental devastation
for much of the low-income, densely populated country, as well as
serious consequences for Bangladesh’s agriculture and fishing
industries. In addition to being the most dependent on externally
sourced water, Bangladesh is the poorest of the three countries in
question, as well as the most densely populated, leaving it with fewer
resources and fewer options to respond to challenges created by water
diversions.
Figure 1: Total Available Renewable Water Resources6
Country

China

India

Bangladesh

External
Water
Resources
17,169
3
(million m )

647,220

1,105,644

Total
Water
Resources
2,840,000
3
(million m )

1,907,760

1,210,644

External
.9%
Dependency Ratio

33.4%

91.3%

5

World Bank, “India’s Water Economy: Bracing for a Turbulent Future,”
December 22, 2005.
6
Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Aquastat online
data 2011.
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Figure 2: Dependency Ratio in Renewable Water7

.

B. Brahmaputra River: Course, Length, and Geography
The Brahmaputra begins from its source in the Kailas range of
the Himalayas and flows 2,300 miles before emptying into the Bay of
Bengal in Bangladesh. Its course takes it through China, India, and
Bangladesh, and its watershed also falls within parts of Nepal, Bhutan,
and Burma. Reflecting the diversity of people and geography along its
course, the river goes by many names, including the Yarlung Tsangpo
(also spelled Zangbo) in Tibet, the Brahmaputra in India, and the
Jamuna in Bangladesh.

7

“The dependency ratio is a good indicator of where tension and conflict over
water-sharing and use can occur. The map clearly depicts such areas including
central Asia, the Middle East (especially Syria and Iraq), India and Pakistan,
and surprisingly, low land countries such as the Netherlands.” United Nations
Environment Programme, 2008,
http://www.unep.org/dewa/vitalwater/article79.html.
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Beginning in the Tibetan Plateau’s Angshi Glacier, the river
flows eastward for nearly 700 miles between the main range of the
Himalayas to its south and the Kailas Range to its north, gaining
strength from tributaries along the way. The river’s journey through
Tibet takes place at an average altitude of more than 12,000 feet,
making it the world’s highest-flowing river system.
After passing the city of Pei in Tibet, the river turns northeast
and makes its so-called Great Bend in Tibet’s Nyangtri Prefecture.
Here the river runs through narrow gorges in a series of rapids and
cascades before turning south and southwest to flow through the Grand
Canyon of the Tsangpo, the longest, steepest, and one of the deepest
canyons on earth. The canyon’s overall average depth is about 7,440
feet, and at its deepest reaches 19,714 feet, more than twice as deep as
the Grand Canyon. During its journey through the canyon, the
Brahmaputra has the largest slope deflection of any river surface in the
world at 75.35 percent. The geology creates the potential for immense
hydropower generation if the river is tamed.
After leaving the Tibet Autonomous Region, the river then
passes through the territory of Arunachal Pradesh, whose control
remains disputed by China and India. This 56,000-square-mile area is
currently controlled by India but was captured by China during their
1962 border war. Although Beijing subsequently withdrew voluntarily
to the current effective line of demarcation, it still refuses to recognize
India’s control over the region. The resulting border conflict, along
with similar conflicts over other disputed segments of the border,
remains one of the most significant potential flashpoints affecting SinoIndian relations.
The river next enters Assam state in northeastern India, where
it is fed by other Himalayan tributaries to become the Brahmaputra. It
is a powerful river even in the dry season, and during the rains its banks
are more than six miles apart at points.
The river runs for several hundred miles through India before
crossing the border into Bangladesh, where it follows a 150-mile course
as the Jamuna. It then joins with the Ganges, Hinduism’s holiest river,
before emptying into the Bay of Bengal.
16
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The Ganges-Brahmaputra is a huge river system, with more
people living in its basin than in all of Western Europe and North
America combined. The river system’s average discharge is the third
largest in the world, behind only the Amazon and the Congo. At its
terminus, more than 1,000,000 cubic feet per second of water flow into
the ocean, approximately 700,000 of which are supplied by the
Brahmaputra.
C. Chinese Water Projects and the Brahmaputra
As the upper riparian country, China is able to make decisions
that directly affect the volume of water available to its downstream
neighbors, and of the numerous rivers crossing from China into India
and Bangladesh, the Brahmaputra is the most important. Its mean
annual transboundary runoff volume (the average amount of the river
flow that crosses international borders) almost equals the total crossborder flows of all the other rivers directly flowing into India from
Tibet, and is greater than the combined cross-border flows of the
Mekong and the Salween, the two main Tibetan Plateau rivers flowing
into Southeast Asia.8
China is the world’s most aggressive dam builder, and Chinese
water projects have already been accused of causing environmental
damage and forced displacement of people in neighboring downstream
countries. To the country’s southeast, for instance, although the
governments of Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia have been
reluctant to directly confront their larger neighbor over water use,
tensions continue to rise as dams on the Chinese portion of the Mekong
River are seen to disrupt river flows and cause environmental damage. 9
Although China’s leaders long denied having plans for major
hydrological works along the Brahmaputra, studies and plans involving
Brahmaputra hydro projects have been promulgated over the last
several decades, and dam building has begun.
8

Brahma Chellaney, “China’s New War Front,” Times of India, April 23,
2013.
9
Michael Richardson, “Dams in China Turn the Mekong into a River of
Discord,” Yale Global Online, July 16, 2009,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/dams-china-turn-mekong-river-discord.
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In 2003, the Chinese state newspaper People’s Daily reported
the initiation of a feasibility study to examine the possibility of
undertaking a “major hydropower project” located at the
Brahmaputra’s Great Bend. Eagerly anticipating the power to be
generated, the report noted that the Tibetan portion of the river “boasts
a water energy reserve of about 100 million kilowatts, or one-sixth of
the country’s total, ranking second behind the Yangtze river, China’s
longest.” 10 The study made public something long suspected: The
Chinese government was fully aware of the river’s power-generation
potential and was actively considering exploiting it.
In 2006, the State Council, China’s 35-member cabinet,
authorized detailed planning for the Tsangpo Project at the Great Bend.
The full plan is reported to comprise two projects: the construction of a
dam at the Great Bend more than twice the size of the Three Gorges
Dam (currently the world’s largest as measured by installed generation
capacity), and the diversion of the Brahmaputra’s course as part of the
South-North Project’s Great Western Route. Particularly noteworthy
were press reports reviving previous discussions about using nuclear
detonations to blast a 10-mile-long tunnel through the Himalayas to
reroute the river’s flow. The discussion of nuclear demolition has the
potential to upend existing efforts to prevent the use of nuclear bombs
in civil engineering, adding a nuclear nonproliferation challenge to an
already thorny issue between neighbors.
China’s interest in nuclear demolition along the Brahmaputra
route is one reason that ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), an international agreement not to detonate any nuclear
devices, has been stalled since the late 1990s. Beijing’s desire to
preserve the option of using nuclear detonations for hydrological
engineering (sometimes referred to as peaceful nuclear explosions, or
PNEs) has made China the only country to request that a PNE
exception be added to the treaty’s language. This proposed PNE
exception has the potential to further undermine the already weak
nonproliferation regime in South Asia, since nonproliferation experts
10

People’s Daily, “China to Conduct Feasibility Study on Power Project in
Tibet,” July 17, 2003.

18

CHRISTOPHER: WATER WARS
suggest that any detonation can offer data with military value. 11 The
issue remains a non-starter for negotiators from the United States and
elsewhere. Nonetheless, the revival of the plans in 2005 and 2006 was
greeted with excitement by hydrological engineers in China. A
hydrologist at the Chinese Academy of Sciences said in a media
interview: “Now the Western Route isn’t just an abstract plan; it will go
ahead.”12
In April 2010, during a visit by Indian Foreign Minister S.M.
Krishna to Beijing, a Chinese official first identified by name the site
on the Brahmaputra where initial dam construction would take place:
Zangmu, in Tibet. Chinese officials assured India that the projects
would be run-of-the-river and would create no water shortages
downstream. (The term “run-of-the-river” is used to describe
hydroelectric power plants that incorporate little or no storage of
dammed water, leaving them subject to seasonal water flows and
unable to regulate generation in response to peak power.) In response to
India’s subsequent requests for additional information about the plans,
China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said, “China adopts a
responsible attitude towards the development of cross border water
resources. We adopt a policy that protection goes together with
development, and take into full consideration the interests of
downstream countries.”13
Further information about the dam building plan was released
as part of China’s current five-year energy plan, promulgated in
January 2013. The plan includes proposals for three medium-sized
dams on the Yarlung Zangbo. In a move that raised tension between the
two countries, India was not consulted prior to the release of the plan
and only learned about the projects from the Chinese press. This led the
Indian government to protest strongly, reminding Beijing that India
11

John Horgan, “‘Peaceful’ Nuclear Explosions,” Scientific American, June
1996, p. 14.
12
“China Taps Tibetan Waters,” International Herald Tribune, August 1, 2006.
13
“Will Adopt ‘Reasonable’ Attitude on Cross-Border River Issues: China,”
Economic Times, June 14, 2011,
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-0614/news/29657046_1_brahmaputra-yarlung-tsangpo-dam
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remains “a lower riparian State with considerable established user
rights to the waters of the river.”14
At present, the issue remains at the top of India’s bilateral
agenda with China. In March 2013, at the first meeting between Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh and China’s new leader Xi Jinping, which
took place on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit, Prime Minister
Singh proposed the creation of a joint mechanism to study Chinese
activity on the Brahmaputra. He spoke to the Indian media about the
conversation: “I also took the opportunity to raise the issue of transborder river systems and I requested the Chinese Government to
provide a joint mechanism to enable us to assess the type of
construction activity that is going on in the Tibetan Autonomous
Region. The President of China assured me that they were quite
conscious of their responsibilities and the interest of the lower riparian
countries. As regards the specific mechanism that I had suggested, he
said that they would have it further looked into.” 15 The following
month, China rejected out of hand the creation of a new water
negotiation mechanism with India.16
In assessing his meeting with President Xi, Prime Minister
Singh expressed sanguine confidence regarding China’s intentions: “As
of now, our assessment is that whatever activity are taking place on the
Bramhamputra region in Tibet, they are essentially the run-of-the-river
projects and therefore there is no cause for worry on our part.”17 The
Prime Minister’s confidence notwithstanding, the pattern of China’s

14

“Downstream States’ Interests Shouldn’t Be Harmed: India to China,”
Indian Express, February 1, 2013,
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/downstream-states—interests-shouldn-tbe-harmed-india-to-china/1067777/
15
Prime Minister of India, “Onboard Media Interaction with PM on Return
from BRICS Summit,” press release, March 28, 2013,
http://pmindia.gov.in/press-details.php?nodeid=1587
16
“China Spikes India’s Proposal for Joint Mechanism on Brahmaputra,”
Hindu, April 17, 2013.
17
Prime Minister of India, “Onboard Media Interaction with PM on Return
from BRICS Summit,” press release, March 28, 2013,
http://pmindia.gov.in/press-details.php?nodeid=1587.
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dam construction to date suggests that its downstream neighbors may
have cause for concern.
China has already established a template for dam construction
on both cross-border and domestic rivers. The country has historically
begun with small, upstream dams before moving on to larger
construction projects further downstream, culminating in massive
engineering works such as the Three Gorges Dam. Indian water
security expert Brahma Chellaney spoke with the Washington Post
about this dynamic after the 2013 Five Year Plan was released:18
From the Yangtze to the Mekong and now the
Brahmaputra, Chinese dam building follows a wellestablished pattern. ... There are 12 small dams on the
Brahmaputra’s upper reaches and tributaries and one
medium-size dam under construction on the river ... the
next step will be larger dams in spots where the river
picks up huge amounts of water and momentum nearer
the Indian border. Those dams could not only affect
water flows but also remove nutrient-rich silt that helps
nourish agriculture downstream.
The overall effects of large-scale dam construction are well
understood. They include decreased volume of water available for
downstream use; disruption of natural flooding cycles; the holding back
of nutrient-rich sediment; and changes to riparian, marine, and fishery
ecology and economy. In future years, climate change may well
exacerbate these effects, particularly in glacier-fed rivers like the
Brahmaputra. Higher temperatures are likely to increase the rate at
which glaciers melt, leading to increased river flows in the short run but
decreases long-term. If China moves ahead with its dam building, the
result will be control by Beijing over an ever larger percentage of a
constantly shrinking river. It is this possibility that suggests why
Beijing and New Delhi may be on a collision course over the
Brahmaputra.
18

Simon Denyer, “Chinese Dams in Tibet Raise Hackles in India,”
Washington Post, February 7, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/201302-07/world/36967163_1_development-of-cross-border-rivers-lower-andupper-stream-chinese-dams.
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III. Dynamics of Interstate Water Conflicts: The
Brahmaputra and Beyond
China’s commitment to construct ever-larger upriver dams
reflects a zero-sum mentality on water use that has the potential to
bring it directly into conflict with India. Farther downstream, the
actions of both countries affect Bangladesh. Whether this conflict
escalates beyond diplomacy to an actual water war is impossible to
predict at this stage. Yet in spite of, or perhaps because of, the
uncertainty, the Brahmaputra case study is a useful tool for identifying
some salient features of cross-border water conflicts, as well as
exploring the Sino-Indian context and the issues particular to this river.
A. International River Governance
Understanding water in a strategic context depends first on
understanding the norms and realities of international river use and
governance. The right to use the water of a border-crossing river
involves a combination of de facto and de jure control—control in fact
and control in law. Fortunately for China, and unfortunately for its
neighbors, China has a strong hand by both measures.
From a realpolitik perspective, the most important control is de
facto, which depends entirely on geography. Simply put, it is better to
be upstream than downstream. Here, China is in the driver’s seat. By
controlling Tibet, China controls the Brahmaputra, along with the
source of the other major Himalayan-origin river systems (this dynamic
is explored further below, in the section on Tibet). Suffice it to say that,
as long as Tibet remains a part of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), China’s regional hydrological hegemony is assured.
But even if possession is, as the saying goes, nine-tenths of the
law, international water law still has a role to play. The Helsinki Rules
on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, adopted in 1966, set
forth the basic principle that countries are allowed to use the water that
flows within their borders. Further rules were codified in the UN
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
22
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Watercourses, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in
1997 but has yet to go into force. (China is neither a party nor a
signatory to this treaty.) Overall, customary international water law sets
forth an allowable water usage framework, taking into effect multiple
factors including historic use, volume of water contributed by each
country’s territorial rivers, population size, and future needs. Of
particular significance here is the legal preference given to the first
state to “use” water by building dams, diversion projects, irrigation, or
other engineered works. De jure control over a river is enhanced by
investments in dams or other construction. Through its expanding dambuilding campaign on the Brahmaputra, China seems increasingly
likely to obtain strong de jure standing to accompany its de facto
control.
As noted, it is better for practical reasons to have the water first
and for legal reasons to use it first, and China does both, but Beijing
has chosen to further maximize its maneuver room by refusing to enter
into formal water-sharing agreements with any of its neighbors. Indeed,
when China announced its dam building plans for the Brahmaputra in
2010, it also stated that, since it was not party to any water-sharing
treaties with India, it was under no formal obligation to share any
information on its dam construction plans whatsoever, but that it
choose to do so magnanimously, “out of a sense of trust.”19 Officials in
India and elsewhere have repeatedly expressed frustration over China’s
refusal to provide the planning data needed to enable effective
monitoring of construction and its impacts, but China has thus far
turned a deaf ear to these protestations. And as long as Beijing has
signed no treaties or agreements pledging to do otherwise, New Delhi
is left without an international legal body with jurisdiction to hear its
appeals.
Indian strategists have been particularly frustrated by New
Delhi’s failure to reach binding water agreements with China because
India in 1960 voluntarily entered into a water treaty with its
19
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downstream neighbor and perpetual rival Pakistan. According to the
provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty, India sets aside 80 percent of the
waters of the Indus River system for Pakistani use. Furthermore, in
1996 India entered into the Ganges Treaty with Bangladesh. This treaty
guarantees a minimum level of cross-border flows into Bangladesh and
divides the Ganges’ waters almost equally between the two countries.
Critics of the Indian government’s handling of water issues ask why
New Delhi has voluntarily shown what they see as generosity toward
the country’s downstream partners without finding a way to obtain
similarly open-handed promises from its upstream neighbor, China.20
As such, although international river law has room to grow in
scope and importance, the problem facing the Brahmaputra basin is not
that there exists no precedent for negotiating equitable water-sharing
solutions. India’s own treaties with Bangladesh and Pakistan could
serve as at least one reference point, as could any number of the more
than 400 other freshwater-sharing agreements and treaties inked since
the nineteenth century.21 Instead, for believers in the power of bilateral
or multilateral institutions to mitigate conflict, the inconvenient truth is
that participation in water-sharing agreements remains optional. China
refuses to opt in, and India has not yet shown itself able to coax or
force China to the table and extract binding, enforceable concessions.
Beijing’s recalcitrance on this point is one of many impediments to the
construction of a rules- and norms-based international relations system
in the region. Until such a system is put in place, China will be free to
proceed with dam building as it sees fit, unfettered by treaty or
international law.
B. Food Security: Food Imports as “Virtual Water”
Although raw materials like minerals, timber, and oil obviously
differ from one another, they are each fungible, internationally traded
commodities; in other words, oil or timber or minerals from one part of
20
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the world can largely be substituted for similar quantities of the same
material from elsewhere. As a result, they behave similarly on
international markets. Water is different. As a resource for which there
is functionally no international marketplace—at least until demand
becomes sufficiently acute to create such a market—and for which
access is determined primarily by geography, water as a strategic
commodity is unique.
Because there is no major world market for trading water itself,
to understand how water moves around the globe today it is necessary
to look at trade in other goods, introducing the concept of virtual water.
All finished products require water to greater or lesser degrees for their
production. Therefore, importing intermediate or finished products is
an indirect way of importing the embedded water required to grow or
make them. In China and India, where agriculture currently accounts
for 70 percent and more than 50 percent, respectively, of water
consumption, the most significant tradable commodities from a water
perspective are foodstuffs.22
At present, both China and India are net exporters of food.
According to Brahma Chellaney, “China and India together account
for … 52.8 percent of the world’s rice production, 30.1 percent of the
wheat, 21 percent of the corn, and 28.5 percent of the total grain.”23 As
China and India continue to grow, and as they grow wealthier and the
inputs to their citizens’ diets move further up the value chain, they are
likely to cross the threshold to become net food importers. Water
scarcity will increase the prospect of this transition taking place and
force one or both of these countries to seek additional imports from the
water-rich countries better able to provide the embedded water that
goes into growing surplus food. This requirement, anathema to planners
seeking domestic food security, will add yet another dimension to
22

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Water and Food
Security Fact Sheet,” World Food Summit, 1996,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/x0262e/x0262e01.htm.
23
Chellaney, Brahma, Water: Asia's New Battleground, Kindle ed.
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011). Data is from 2008.
For 2010-2012 data, see Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, Crop Prospects and Food Situation, no. 1 (March 2013): 5,
www.fao.org/docrep/017/al998e/al998e.pdf.

25

CHRISTOPHER: WATER WARS
China and India’s already complicated strategic calculus vis-à-vis
commodity demands.
The concept of water scarcity leading to food insecurity is one
of the thorniest issues in most cross-border water disputes, and the
conflict over the Brahmaputra is no exception. China’s ability to
control the river’s flow through damming and diversion could
potentially give Beijing the ability to choke off the food supply to its
largest neighbor. It has been likened to the ability to lay siege to an
enemy’s castle without ever having to cross one’s own border.
Moreover, unlike some other sources of power in international
diplomacy, the threat of water diversion is not “use it or lose it.” Once
the dams have been built, the ability to create suffering at the human
level in India and Bangladesh through induced water and food
shortages will stand implicitly behind any request coming from Beijing.
The implications are not lost on New Delhi. For India, even the
intimation of such a threat in the context of the Brahmaputra could be a
nearly existential hazard. It is not difficult to imagine Indian military
planners preparing for such an eventuality by exploring options to
destroy or otherwise neutralize the offending dams. The result is that
the food security issues that accompany dam building give birth to a
flashpoint and source of tension that, once created, will be difficult to
undo. This makes food security one of the drivers most likely to spur
New Delhi into action over Beijing’s moves on the river.
C. Water Governance Is Simultaneously International and
Domestic
Along cross-border rivers, water consumption choices made by
the upper riparian state affect the downriver state. However, actual
water consumption decisions are generally made either at the local
level, or by central government planners who have local consumption
in mind. (This is even true of China’s giant water diversion projects,
which are meant to provide water for local use in regions currently
suffering from scarcity.) For this reason, domestic politics can play an
equal or greater role than international relations when it comes to how
water resources are actually used.
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In China, the state-planned economic model in place since
1949 is overlaid atop a historical imperative dating back to imperial
times to control the country’s flood-prone rivers. The result has been a
“campaign” mentality focusing on huge capital investments in largescale hydro projects. Rather than making hard choices about allocating
limited local water resources—or devolving authority to the local level
to make those decisions—Beijing has promulgated large, capitalintensive solutions such as the South-to-North Water Diversion Project.
The individual components that make up the South-to-North
Water Diversion Project range in size, but China has already
demonstrated its comfort level with giant dams such as the Three
Gorges. Mega hydro projects such as these take an extraordinary toll on
local residents. The Three Gorges Dam flooded important cultural and
archeological sites, affected local and downstream ecology, and forced
the relocation of 1.3 million people. Many within China and abroad
objected to the dam, and its construction was not without protests and
opposition, but there is little that local residents in China can do to
block a project of this kind from going forward once the decision has
been made in Beijing. This is even more true in the ethnic minority
region of Tibet than elsewhere in China. Any organized protest or
opposition to a significant dam project by Tibetans would almost
certainly elicit a swift and thorough government crackdown. For this
reason, although India might hope to ally itself with locals in
opposition to the construction of dams, China’s dam-building history
offers minimal hope that this would be an effective tactic.
India faces its own challenging domestic dynamic around the
subject of dam building. The country’s robust democracy allows local
Indian interest groups to block large projects they oppose much more
effectively than is possible in China. Even more significant is that India
has not dedicated nearly the same capital resources China has to
hydrological infrastructure. Where China has built more than 25,800
large dams, India has constructed 4,300. 24 On the Brahmaputra,
24
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although India has expressed a desire to complete more water works,
the country has been unable thus far to successfully undertake major
damming or river improvement projects. While this represents a goodnews story to ecological groups that oppose large-scale Indian hydro
works, it does little to help India stake a legal claim to river usage or to
allow it to generate power or regulate river flows. It remains to be seen
whether major Indian Brahmaputra projects will succeed in the future,
but as long as the river’s source in Tibet is under Chinese control and
local Tibetan opposition to dam projects remains weak, the most
significant investments in damming and changing the water’s flow will
remain on the Chinese side of the border.

D. Tibet as a Water Issue
China is the source of cross-border river flows to more other
countries than anywhere else, but thinking of the source of these major
rivers as “China” ignores the reality that all of the important rivers
crossing into other countries originate in Chinese minority regions. The
huge glaciers and high altitude of the Himalayas make this region the
source of most of Asia’s great river systems, including the Brahmaputra,
the Indus, the Sutlej, the Salween, and the Mekong. These rivers pass
through 11 countries and nourish about 2 billion people, but they all
originate in Tibet. This makes the Tibetan Plateau the spigot of Asia,
and it is Beijing’s hand on the tap.
For U.S. policy makers, the significance of the Tibet issue
centers on rights for Tibetans. The historical reasons for this include
concern for the unjust treatment Tibet has faced, charismatic leadership
from the Dalai Lama, and effective lobbying in Washington. Tibet has
long been a cause célèbre in Washington, and has created unusual
political bedfellows by uniting Democrats and Republicans eager to
take a stand against China.
For Beijing, however, keeping Tibet a part of China goes
beyond the already important strategic objective of maintaining the
PRC’s territorial integrity. Tibet is the hydrological lynchpin of the
region. Control of the Tibetan Plateau allows China to remain a waterindependent country whose major rivers all originate within its own
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borders, and allows it to exercise hegemonic hydrological leverage over
its neighbors, including India, its only potential peer competitor in the
region. And the future construction of ever-larger dams on those rivers
will offer China the capability to choke off those neighbors’ freshwater
supplies or threaten to do so.
Any understanding of Tibet’s importance to China must
include an understanding of the related water issues. It also presents
India a potential option for leverage. Since fleeing China in 1959, the
Dalai Lama has made his home and government-in-exile in Dharamsala,
India. India’s relationship with China’s Tibetan population remains
strong as a result. India has long acceded to China’s control over Tibet,
but should New Delhi decide it is worth incurring the wrath of Beijing
to press for greater water usage rights, the issue of Beijing’s treatment
of Tibet and relationship with the Dalai Lama presents one possible
avenue to pursue. It is a potentially risky move in that it would
certainly be met with opposition from China in the strongest possible
terms. However, if the PRC continues with aggressive dam building
and access to water becomes an existential concern for India, the status
of Tibet may become a more important factor in Sino-Indian relations.

IV. Conclusion
In looking at the issues presented by the dispute over use of the
Brahmaputra, the first question we must ask is, how much does this
actually matter? Is this a clear and present danger to India, or simply
one of many friction points in a challenging bilateral relationship? Will
use of the Brahmaputra’s water push India and China over the line and
provoke a border skirmish or all-out war, or is it an irritating but
tolerable fact of life?
The ways that China goes about its dam building clearly matter
a great deal in determining how dire a situation India faces. On the one
hand, if Beijing holds true to its word that all Brahmaputra projects are
to be small and run-of-the-river, India will have little to fear. On the
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other hand, as the old saying goes, hope is not a strategy, and Beijing
has a track record of insisting that all will be well and then turning
around and unveiling a less attractive alternative scenario already under
development as a fait accompli.
How much of a threat China’s actions poses to India is a
question that only New Delhi can answer, but if history is any guide,
China can be expected to press ahead with increasingly larger dam
projects. It remains to be seen whether Prime Minister Singh’s recently
expressed confidence in China’s intentions represents a widely held
consensus among members of the Indian government or simply rhetoric
designed to mollify China without diminishing India’s already limited
options. India’s downstream status means that it starts out somewhat at
China’s mercy. It has been dealt a weak hand geographically, and the
cards it has, it has not played well. New Delhi has failed to negotiate
aggressively with Beijing for greater water rights and has willingly
conceded that Tibet is part of the PRC. These accommodationist
tendencies have likely helped to smooth tensions and improve relations
with China, but if the price eventually proves to be forfeiture of India’s
hydrological independence, the relationship will have been dearly
bought.
If, then, India determines at some point that dams and water
diversions on the Chinese-controlled portion of the Brahmaputra do
present a threat, the question becomes: what instruments of national
power does India have at its disposal to stop construction or mitigate
the consequences? To be clear, this question is not meant to be an
alarmist suggestion that a Sino-Indian water war is imminent. As Dr.
Jabin Jacob of the Institute for Chinese Studies in New Delhi accurately
notes, “China and India see themselves as responsible regional and
global powers, and a war of any kind between them will not only set
back bilateral relations but also damage their reputations internationally.
At the moment, this is not a cost that either side is willing to pay.” 25
Nonetheless, it is worth exploring what options India could choose to
25
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pursue should it determine in the future that it needs to act more
assertively on the subject of the Brahmaputra.
The panoply of possible responses encompasses all the
implements in the international relations toolbox, including diplomacy,
international law, economic pressure, covert action, and ultimately
military force. In the event that India decides to take up the issue more
stridently, continued diplomacy will be the first response.
Unfortunately, in the search for effective water conflict resolution
mechanisms, the history of Sino-Indian relations does not offer much
cause optimism. The countries’ three post-independence border
conflicts—the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1967 Chola Incident, and the
1987 Sino-Indian Skirmish—have left a legacy of mistrust. China and
India have still not reached an agreement on the mutually disputed
territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin, both sides of the
border are militarized, and India continues to be leery of China’s close
ties with Pakistan. Confidence-building visits and statements by senior
leaders have helped to warm relations in recent years, but the two
countries have neither a historical reservoir of trust nor a shared
framework for addressing water issues. For these reasons, if the Indian
government decides that China’s water usage presents a threat that
must be tackled more forcefully, the diplomatic structures in place
today may not be equal to the task of addressing the issue.
To yield results on an issue of such importance to Beijing, any
diplomatic approach by New Delhi will have to be backed with weighty
sticks and/or juicy carrots. Appeal to an international legal body or
intergovernmental organization such as the United Nations will remain
a fruitless exercise as long as China refuses to enter into water-sharing
agreements. India would gain much by inducing China to constrain its
actions and voluntarily enter into a water-sharing agreement, but only a
strong inducement could yield this result. As long as bilateral trade
remains heavily weighted in China’s favor, economic incentives lack
the necessary punch. Indian pushback against China’s control over
Tibet could serve as one possible stick but, as mentioned above, this is
a card that must be played delicately due to Beijing’s extreme
sensitivity to this issue. India could offer support to China on issues of
shared concern, but for this carrot to be worth China’s while, the issues
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would have to be significant indeed. It is difficult to imagine a
sufficiently important issue on which India could align with China
without also putting itself crossways with the United States or upsetting
China’s relationship with its longtime partner Pakistan, or both.
If diplomatic and economic inducements fail but the issue is
still deemed a major threat, Indian planners may feel forced to explore
more aggressive options. Covert campaigns to induce Tibetan
opposition to dam building might play to India’s strengths in terms of
the country’s support of the Dalai Lama and ties to ethnic Tibetans, but
there is no certainty that the Dalai Lama or any organized group of
Tibetans would support such an effort (in fact, the Dalai Lama’s recent
positions on Tibet suggest it is unlikely). Moreover, even the most
successful campaign of this kind would risk infuriating Beijing without
doing more than temporarily halting or slowing dam construction. The
risk-reward tradeoff that would be involved if India took direct action
against a dam would be even more stark. Sabotage, whether via
computer virus or a traditional kinetic operation, has the real potential
to be viewed as an act of war. Only if India deems Chinese dam
construction to be an equally aggressive act would such a course of
action be warranted. And an outright military strike against a
neighboring country’s dam is so clearly a declaration of war as to be
conceivable only in the most dire of circumstances.
In any examination of India’s potential options, timing plays a
crucial role. The key dimension is that this issue presents India with a
steadily closing window. The earlier India pushes back against Chinese
dam building, the more options will be available to it. The longer it
waits, the more it will face a choice between accepting China’s actions
or taking dire measures. At the end, this is probably the most broadly
generalizable insight that can be drawn from study of the Brahmaputra
issue. In riparian relations, delay favors the upstream state. A
downstream state—in this case India—is far more able to influence the
eventual outcome and reach a diplomatically negotiated fair use plan by
intervening early. Its negotiating position is strongest before or during
the planning stages of dam construction. Once building commences, a
downstream state’s options shrink. And after the offending dams and
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water diversions are complete and operational, a downstream state’s
means of seeking redress are few indeed.
Here, we return to the plight of Bangladesh. Smallest, poorest,
most heavily dependent on foreign-originated water, and weakest
militarily and diplomatically of the three Brahmaputra countries, it has
still managed to negotiate more effectively with its upper riparian
neighbor India than India has with China. Bangladesh took to heart the
need to cut the most advantageous deal possible for itself before dams
were built and water became scarce. Unfortunately for Bangladesh,
even if India upholds its obligations under the Ganges Treaty, there is
no escaping the river’s geography, and the destiny of the Brahmaputra
will be written farther upstream. For this reason, the best possible
course of action for decision makers in Dhaka is to do what they can to
induce China to share the river equitably, and to join with their
counterparts in Delhi to negotiate for the same.
The Brahmaputra is not the world’s largest river, but its waters
are shared by the two most populous countries, so what happens there
matters a great deal. Management of the river touches on a host of
crucial and complicated issues, including territorial integrity, food
security, international law, the intersection of domestic and foreign
policy, and the asymmetric power of neighboring states with huge
populations and great aspirations. The way that the river dispute is
managed—or mismanaged—will tell us much about the direction of
Sino-Indian relations, and about whether water wars will emerge as one
of the major international relations challenges of the twenty-first
century.
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Projected Water Scarcity in the Middle East27
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